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Abstract
This paper highlights how contract incompleteness can threaten the performance of public
procurement facilities management contracts during their implementation stages, based on a
multiple case study comprising five public procurement services contracts. The paper takes a
principle-agent view and with the unit of analysis being the contract itself. The paper shows
that contract contingencies are almost inevitable and may stem from the written contract or
from the participating organisations. Written and unwritten contract management mechanisms
were used in practice to deal with contingencies as they arose in the services case studies
examined. The paper found that written contracts do not always provide satisfactory remedies
for unexpected contingencies. Ex post mechanisms were used to manage the contract including
incentives, information systems and signals. Time, resource or position signals were used in
all five cases and provided an effective mechanism to manage unexpected contingencies in
written contracts that proved to be incomplete.
Keywords - services, facilities management, public procurement, principal, agent, contract,
unwritten, signal.
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Ex-post service contract performance management
1. Introduction
Client organisations use contracts to specify the work to be carried out for them by contractor
organisations. The performance of such contracts is of critical importance for both principals
and agents (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The ex-ante preparation of written contracts is
important to successful outcomes. So too however is the successful ex-post management of
contracts. This paper looks at the use of signals (Spence, 1973) in managing the performance
of contracts after the contract has been implemented. Signals can be used to deal with
contingencies that arise unexpectedly and where remedies do not exist in the ex-ante written
contracts.

One means by which the procurement function supports the performance of the core business
is through the supply of facility services (Haugen and Klungseth, 2017; Pitt et al, 2014).
Contracts with service providers therefore are an important means for facilities managers to
create value for their organisations. However, the value of incorporating service providers’
products, services, information, and personnel into client processes and operations is threatened
when contract contingencies arise (Coenen et al, 2013). Contingencies, stemming from
inadequate definitions of scope or an absence of quality benchmarks, or from inadequate
planning of policy implementations or lack of strategic flexibility, can trigger facilities
management (FM) contract cancellations or renegotiations (Ikediashi et al, 2012). The
importance of contract performance to managers in the delivery of facilities management
services to their organisations and the variety of threats to the successful implementation of
such contracts prompted this study.
Facilities managers using contracts with service providers rely on contract completeness and
good relationships to address contingencies. Completeness depends on the careful design of
the contract ex-ante, i.e. prior to its implementation stage. Good relationships between the
parties after the contract are maintained through ex post measures such as managing disputes
between parties and overcoming contingencies. Regardless of ex-ante mechanisms, such as
detailed procurement and tender documents, difficulties may still arise in the implementation
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stage. To deal with such difficulties, facilities managers must draw on ex post mechanisms to
secure FM service delivery.

This paper specifically examines mechanisms to manage public procurement FM contracts at
the ex post stage. The paper reviews theories of contract and examines five cases of public FM
services contracts at post-tender stage. Since public contracts require frequent public
competitive tenders (Erridge and McIlroy, 2002) and view contract relationships as
performance monitoring (Murray, 2009), these cases offer an opportunity to study ex-ante
management mechanisms used by managers in the contexts of relatively inflexible written
contract terms and short-term contract relationships. These contexts suggest challenges to a
manager’s reliance on assumed contract completeness and good relationships to address
contract contingencies, and provide an empirical basis on which to develop a credible
conceptual model of ex post mechanisms for FM practitioners to better understand and manage
contracts. The paper is organized as follows: first, it reviews the relevant theory in relation to
contracts and contract management, then it presents findings from the empirical study of five
cases, it then develops and puts forward a conceptual model, and finally draws conclusions.

2. Theoretical background
This section briefly reviews the literature on written and unwritten contracts. The section also
briefly reviews signals theory and the use of signals as a mechanism for managing unwritten
contracts.
2.1 Contracts
Contracts are described as the efforts by parties in a voluntary exchange to align incentives and
form governance structures to mitigate hazards and realise mutual advantage (Williamson,
2002). While governance mechanisms should be farsighted (Williamson, 1999), in fact realworld contracts are incomplete (Badenfelt, 2011; Nakhla, 2016; Oluka and Basheka, 2014) and
may lack clarity or remedies (Walls, 2005). Therefore, despite ex-ante controls such as legal
constraints (Potoski, 1999) ex post trade is only partially contractible (Hart and Moore, 2008).
However well written, contracts will not sufficiently provide for some contingencies and
remedies will not always be enforceable. As a result, implementation of contracts can be
challenging (Hashim et al., 2016). In public sector contracts high levels of transaction costs
have been found at post contractual stage due to a lack of procurement contract management
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capacity among principals (Rasheli, 2016). Contract theory alone does not provide the FM
practitioner with sufficient mechanisms to manage situations of unforeseen contingencies. The
working relationship between the client and contractor (principal and agent) has been found to
be a key enabler of good contract performance outcome (Lam, 2017; Lok and Baldry, 2014).
It is proposed that consideration of agency theory and inclusion of the use of signals by the
principal enables a better model of contract management to be developed.
The theory underpinning contracts is held to be agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1985; Eisenhardt,
1989; Logan, 2000; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Agency theory examines situations where
an agent acts in a decision-making role on behalf of a principal (Ross, 1973). Agency theory
proposes two mechanisms to manage ex post performance: a set of incentives inducing the
agent to accept risks and secure outcomes, and an information system to measure performance
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). In an FM contract, the client may incentivise
inputs by paying on a ‘time and materials’ basis, or outputs by paying a fixed price (Bajari and
Tadelis, 2001).

Both approaches require an appropriate information system such as

monitoring, reporting, or auditing to secure outcomes (Hansson, 2010). These ex post written
contract management mechanisms are summarised in table 1.
-----------------------------------------Table 1 approximately here
------------------------------------------2.2 Signals as a mechanism for managing unwritten contracts
Shannon (1948) identifies the fundamental problem of communication as reproducing at one
point a message that was selected at another point. He proposed a general model that comprises
an information source sending a message, a transmitter transforming the message into a signal,
which is assumed to import noise, with an inverse process undertaken by a receiver, which then
passes the message and noise to a destination or person intended to receive the message.
Authors have reduced Shannon’s model to the three essential terms of communication theory:
the sender, the receiver and the information or communication that relates them (Stichweh,
2000, p. 10; Warner, 2007, p. 318) (see figure 1). This signalling view of communication is
important because it broadens communication to include actions as well as words. The
expenditure of the sender’s time in social interaction (Spence, 1973) or spoken and unspoken
communications of intentions (Rousseau, 1995) are signals which may influence the decisions
of the receiver. Therefore the sender’s demonstrations or actions are means of communication
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which, in addition to spoken and written communication, are significant in influencing the
receiver. In principal-agent communications the principal can be regarded as the sender and
the agent as the receiver.
-----------------------------------------Figure 1 approximately here
------------------------------------------Written contracts are unavoidably incomplete (Walls, 2005; Williamson, 1999) but given that
historical supply agreements have successfully existed over long periods, such arrangements
must be partly governed by some informal mechanisms outside the written contract (Coase,
2006). These may be regarded as unwritten contract management mechanisms. For example,
close monitoring of contractor performance may signal a climate of distrust (Kadefors, 2008).
Therefore, while monitoring mechanisms are specified in the written contract, the application
of particularly close attention to monitoring activities will signal the client’s concern to the
contractor in relation to performance. Assuming the contractor becomes aware of the signal
and wishes to prolong the benefits of the contract, this signal will cause the contractor to review
performance behaviours. The client signal to the agent of closer than usual monitoring activity
therefore acts as an unwritten contract mechanism. The literature of information economics
holds that people’s behaviour may be influenced by costly human actions conveying
information (Stiglitz, 2002). Signals are visible non-transactional costly expenditures of
interpersonal time intended to influence observers (Spence, 1973). Within an unwritten
contract relationship then, signals may be viewed as meaningful actions by the principal
comprising the costly expenditures of time which are observed by and influence the agent
towards a response.

It is possible to categorise signals according to how they are sent from a principal and how they
are observed by an agent. From information economics literature, the expenditure of
interpersonal time, or willingness to spend time, may communicate interest towards resolving
disagreement (Spence, 1973). The demonstration of such resources as budgetary control,
expertise, and social skills, may be an influence persuading others towards action (Lawrence
et al, 2005). Also, the non-functional attendance of organisational leadership figures at events
highlights the importance of such events (Spence, 1973). Therefore, a principal may send
signals to an agent by actions demonstrating personal time spent on contract matters, their
resources in relation to the contract, and their seniority of position in their organisation.
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An agent’s observation of a principal’s signal may provide information, may suggest an
incentive, or may demonstrate enhanced mutual interest towards securing the contract
outcomes. For example, observation of a principal’s change from verbal to written
communication may be a signal of poor performance (Nikander and Eloranta, 1997) and
labelled a performance signal. Similarly, observation of a principal’s assurance of confidence
in the agent’s ability may provide an incentive (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) and labelled an
incentive signal. Thirdly, the observation of a principal’s willingness to discuss a disagreement
may facilitate reaching a resolution (Spence, 1973) and labelled a mutual interest signal. These
signals mechanisms, used within the ex post unwritten contract, are summarised in table 2 and
depicted graphically in figure 2.
-----------------------------------------Table 2 and Figure 2 approximately here
------------------------------------------3. Methodology
Given the exploratory nature of the research project, and that the aim of the research was to
generate theory, the project took a qualitative approach based on multiple case studies (Ghauri
and Gronhaug, 2010:109; Yin, 2009) of public procurement FM services contracts. The study
adopted an agency theoretic approach with the unit of analysis being the contract itself
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A similar micro-level multiple case approach was taken by Badenfelt
(2011) to examine response to difficulties with incomplete contracts in IT and construction
industry projects. The paper draws on an inductive theory-building approach (Mintzberg, 1979)
to develop a conceptual model of contract management mechanisms. To enable the building of
theory that is relevant to practitioners (Bowers, 1972) the inductive approach involved the
collection of qualitative data using a small sample of subjects (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill,
2003). Multiple cases allow researchers consider what is unique and what is common across
cases thereby promoting increased theoretical reflection (Bryman and Bell, 2011:63; Yin,
2009).

Qualitative data from five FM contracts from one organization (EdCo) were collected and
examined in detail. Data was collected over eighteen months from archival material including
contract files, tender documents, legal contracts, correspondence, payments, minutes of
meetings and emails. Each of the contract principals was interviewed. Notes of the interviews
were taken and these were examined and analysed along with other case documentation. For
6

each case study a contingency situation was identified and examined and the mechanisms used
by the principal to address this contingency identified, analysed and reported.
4. Findings
EdCo is a government-funded higher education institution with staff and students
accommodated in a number of separate buildings in different urban locations in one city. A
central FM office manages contracts with private firms for services such as waste removal,
catering, and cleaning services. Each contract had an EdCo principal responsible for the
contract budget and service delivery.

The details of each FM contract situation are now considered in turn, highlighting the
mechanisms of the written contract, an arising and previously unforeseen contract contingency,
and the signal mechanisms used by the principal to promote responses from the agent to address
the contingency.
4.1 Waste Removal Contract
The waste removal contract was a five year agreement comprising the removal and disposal of
wastes from EdCo’s buildings by a licenced contractor WasteCo at an annual cost of €300,000.
Although initially managed locally, the EdCo FM office decided to centralise the waste
contract budget and appointed a single EdCo principal to improve transparency. However, in
line with her understanding of the written contract, the WasteCo agent continued to report to
the former local EdCo budget holders. The newly appointed EdCo principal met informally
with the WasteCo agent over coffee to discuss their understanding of the contract, explain that
she alone was now responsible, and to demonstrate that the new approach should improve
EdCo’s costs, WasteCo’s regulatory recycling targets, and indeed WasteCo’s prospects for
tenders with other organisations. Over a number of meetings, the agent offered a central waste
information report format, and a programme to roll out the recycling building-by-building.
In this contract case, a contingency arose when the principal’s organisation centralised the
contract budget and management while the written contract did not specify these arrangements.
The written contract control mechanisms comprised the payments and monthly reports. A
number of unwritten mechanisms were also evident. The principal sent a time signal by
spending additional time explaining the new arrangements, and a resource signal by
demonstrating technical knowledge of regulatory requirements and control of the centralised
7

budget. Incentive and mutual interest signals were evident in the agent’s observance of the
principal’s encouragement that the changes would improve EdCo prospects and that there was
a shared interest between the organisations in achieving the benefits of the contract.
4.2 Canteen Catering Contract
This five year contract comprised the provision of catering services by CaterCo to students and
staff in eight separate locations. CaterCo retained the takings in each location and paid a rent
to EdCo. A contingency arose when the EdCo principal received reports of poor customer
service from a CaterCo location manager, and noticed that this location had a lower than
expected financial turnover. In response, the CaterCo agent advised that this was not a contract
matter. The EdCo principal then wrote a formal letter highlighting her concerns with a
comparative financial review of all locations suggesting that financial performance was linked
to customer care. Separately, she issued an invitation to the CaterCo agent and his senior
management to attend a fundraising event in EdCo. This provided her with an opportunity to
comment positively on the agent’s performance and the benefits of the contract to both parties.
Some weeks later the location manager was reassigned away from customer-facing duties. The
CaterCo agent subsequently reported that the financial turnover figures had shown
improvement.
The contract contingency comprised reports of poor customer service to the principal which
could not be remedied under the terms of the written contract. The written contract mechanisms
comprised the retention of sales proceeds, and the monthly reports and meetings. However, a
number of unwritten mechanisms were also evident. The principal sent a time signal by writing
a comparative report, a resource signal by demonstrating her financial reporting skills, and a
position signal by showing that she had access to senior management figures in her
organisation. In addition, the agent observed a performance signal by the change from verbal
to formal written communication, an incentive signal in the principal’s positive comments to
senior management, and a mutual interest signal from the discussion by senior management of
the shared benefits of the contract.
4.3 Cleaning Contract
A five year cleaning contract was provided by CleanCo to EdCo buildings for a monthly fee
totalling €2 million per year. When the EdCo annual cleaning budget was cut to €1.7 million,
the CleanCo agent noted that since the contract had specified fixed tasks at agreed labour rates,
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the change would be grounds for contract termination. The EdCo principal proposed that it
was in both their professional interests to find ways of continuing the contract. She indicated
her availability for discussions without commitments. She offered to broker any revised
arrangements with EdCo senior management. Over two months a new approach was identified
based on changing cleaning times to office hours, focusing on the heavily used areas, and
setting up a mobile cleaning team. The EdCo principal and CleanCo agent successfully
approached their respective organisations to endorse the new arrangement at the reduced
budget.
This unforeseen contingency arose due to the principal’s organisation reducing the contract
budget. The written contract mechanisms comprised the monthly payments and the monthly
audits, reports, logs and meetings. A number of unwritten mechanisms were also evident. The
principal sent a time signal by declaring availability to the agent, a resource signal by
demonstrating her confidence in gaining approval for any new arrangements, and a position
signal by indicating her access to the senior management decision-makers in her organisation.
In addition, the agent observed an incentive signal in the principal’s highlighting of the benefits
to her managerial reputation in saving the contract, and a mutual interest signal from the
discussion of the benefits to both organisations in continuing the contract.
4.4 Insurance Brokerage Contract
A five year brokerage contract for insurance and claims management was provided by InsureCo
for an annual fee of €500,000. While EdCo academic staff would contact InsureCo prior to
field trips for confirmation of insurance and other advice, the written contract did not
specifically require communications to EdCo end users. Over some months, InsureCo showed
reluctance to take calls and increasingly delayed issuing responses. Following a number of
telephone conversations, the EdCo principal emailed the InsureCo agent changing the location
of monthly meetings to her office, increasing the frequency of meetings from monthly to
weekly, initiating formal written minutes, and instigating a weekly log recording end user
queries and response completions. The principal explained that EdCo auditors independently
review information systems on EdCo contracts, and report back to senior management. On
pointing out that it was in both parties’ interests to record performance data using the proposed
log, the InsureCo agent agreed to use the log on a trial basis. After a number of weekly
meetings, the InsureCo agent resumed taking calls directly from EdCo end users, recording
these in the weekly log, and was able to demonstrate some improvement in response times.
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The slowed response to calls was a contingency which could not be addressed under the terms
of the written contract. The written contract mechanisms comprised the annual fee and the
information meetings. A number of unwritten mechanisms are evident. The principal sent a
time signal by attending more frequent meetings and a resource signal by promoting the weekly
log as a management tool. In addition, the agent observed a performance signal by the change
to formal written minutes, an incentive signal by suffering a time penalty to attend more
meetings, and a mutual interest signal from the principal’s comment that the improved
information system would benefit both EdCo and InsureCo.

4.5 Property Contract
The property rental contract comprises a lease on a 2,000 square metre Victorian premises
which is used as an art school by EdCo. The provider and owner of the premises is PropCo,
which provides the contract agent to manage the property. The contract terms include a fifteen
year lease with an annual rent of €390,000 subject to upward-only rent reviews every five years,
and an internal maintenance obligation on the tenant. While the contract is not the subject of
frequent tenders, there are tenant break options every five years where EdCo may choose to
terminate the rental contract. This break option introduces some degree of contestability into
the contract. The desired contract outcomes for the EdCo principal are the use of a safe property
suitable for staff offices and student classrooms, workshops, and studios to develop artistic
knowledge and skills, at a market rental cost that can be demonstrated to be value for money.
The contract incentives for the agent are EdCo’s quarterly rent payments, and avoidance of
exercising a break option to exit the lease. In practice, these incentives are fixed, as rent reviews
are subject to arbitration and exercising the break option would require finding alternative
accommodation which would be a significant project for EdCo. The contract information
system comprises site meetings every three months between the principal and agent to review
matters and agree actions to resolve any issues.

A matter of contract incompleteness became apparent in relation to significant internal repairs.
In the written contract the EdCo principal is required to repair the interiors while the agent is
required to perform any required structural works. Over a period of winter months, ingress of
damp resulted in paint peeling off the internal walls, leading to complaints from staff and
students regarding the deterioration and the consequent difficulty in fixing the programme
10

artwork to the walls. The agent did concede that the fault was structural in origin, but not accept
the EdCo principal’s view that the consequential requirement for internal works were his
responsibility, or that they were urgently required. The principal stated her intention to
withhold payment of the rent. The agent then emailed proposing that works would be carried
out at the end of the academic year, and that this would be regarded in court of law as a
reasonable response time. Despite a number of conversations, no improved proposal was
received from the agent. At this point the EdCo principal emailed the agent, copying her senior
manager, summarising the problem and requesting action from the agent. She then asked her
senior manager to intervene. The EdCo senior manager telephoned from his personal mobile
telephone directly to the agent’s personal mobile. During the discussion the EdCo senior
manager suggested that while the issue was not clear in the written contract, many end-users
were adversely affected, and it was in both their long-term reputational interests for the matter
to be resolved. The agent apologised and agreed that he would carry the required structural
repairs. The following month, all the agreed works were completed. The findings from this
case and the other four cases are summarised in tables 3 and 4.
-----------------------------------------Table 3 and table 4 approximately here
-------------------------------------------

5. Discussion
All five case studies clearly demonstrate that the contracts as originally written were
incomplete. In all cases unforeseen contingencies arose for which there were no remedies
readily available through the written contract. In the cases of Waste Removal and Insurance
Brokerage the unforeseen contingency initially arose from within the contract itself. In the
cases of Catering and Cleaning the contingencies stemmed from organisational actions or
decisions. In the case of PropCo the contingency arose due to an external factor: adverse
weather conditions. In all five cases both the principal and the agent were motivated to find
solutions to continue the contract and developed approaches based on informal, unwritten
arrangements.

In no case however was the written contract discarded or breached. The solution approach
involved finding a nuanced agreement between the principal and the agent. The client made its
wishes known through signals to the contractor; the contractor interpreted these signals and
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formulated a response. All three kinds of signal given in figure 2 – time, resource, and position
- were used, although not all on each occasion. They were however always used in combination
and for several of the contracts all three kinds of signal were used. On some occasions, for
example the Property contract, the client had to give multiple signals to the contractor before
they responded to the client’s satisfaction. The solution to the problem still fell broadly within
the boundaries of the original contract and often included mechanisms drawn from the contract.
For example while meetings were provided for in the written contract dissatisfaction was
signalled by increasing their frequency, making them more formal, or by inviting senior
managers along.

The findings suggest a new conceptual framework of ex post contract management that
includes the original contract with its standard remedies of information systems and incentives
but also includes unwritten elements including performance, incentive and mutual interest
signals (figure 3). The model highlights the written contract mechanisms that exist to influence
the agent to achieve the contract goals: firstly, incentives such as payments or penalties and,
secondly, information systems such as site meetings, audits, and reports. The model also
highlights the existence of remedies outside the written contract for handling contingencies that
arise during the performance of the contract. For the purposes of the conceptual model, these
approaches are termed the unwritten contract and comprise signals. The principal sends signals
to appeal to the agent to respond to contingencies not covered by the written contract. These
signals are based on the principal’s non-functional expenditure of personal time with the agent,
demonstration of control of resources, or access to positions of organisational leadership. The
agent observes any or all of these behaviours by the principal, and views them as performance
signals, incentive signals, or mutual interest signals. These influence the agent’s decision to
make a new response.
-----------------------------------------Figure 3 approximately here
------------------------------------------6. Conclusion
This study examined five case studies of contracts in their implementation stages, with all five
demonstrating the incompleteness of the written contract terms to provide remedies, and the
use of signals in managing those contingencies that arose towards useful solutions. The study
uses an inductive theory-building approach to develop a novel conceptual model of contract
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management comprising of written and unwritten contracts with the latter initiated mainly by
signals. It uses an information economics perspective of signals as the expenditure of human
time in non-functional activities to convey information (Spence, 1973).
This study makes a number of contributions to theory and practice. In terms of practice, it
demonstrates that written contracts do not always provide a solution to ex post contingencies
that arise with respect to a contracted service. It demonstrates that use of signals by the principal
can allow a nuanced solution to be found to deal with arising contingencies. With respect to
theory, the paper puts forward a model of ex post contract management (figures 2 and 3) that
provides additional levers by which a principal can implement and control a service contract.
This set of contract management levers draws from both the written and the unwritten contract.
In particular the research highlights the active use of time, resource and position signals as
service contract management levers, and that these signals can be used in conjunction with
levers from the written contract such as incentives and information systems. This combination
of levers from the written and unwritten contracts provides a strong theoretical framework for
ex post contract management, a framework that is accessible to practitioners. The paper also
provides an application of agency theory to real life facilities management contract situations.

The paper has implications for practicing FM services contract managers. It underscores the
benefits of widely discussing the detailed written contract specifications ex-ante with
organisational stakeholders to provide a wider range of ex post remedies. It highlights the
importance of careful attention in the design of the contract ex ante to contain clauses to provide
reasonable contract options by the parties ex post in response to contingencies previously
experienced by FM managers. It underscores the potential of the unwritten contract and the
potential of principals’ signals to influence agents’ responses towards resolving unforeseen
contingencies. It highlights the potential usefulness of theory-building to facilities managers in
the search for practical service solutions for their organisations.
The study has the limitations of being exploratory and based on a limited sample of empirical
cases. Future research could include a study of contract mechanisms using a larger sample of
cases to provide greater generalisability. This paper examined situations where the client
organization required a remedy and the response generally required the contractor to extend
itself in some way in order to accommodate the client requirements. Other contract contingency
situations may require the client to alter its behaviour due to signals from the contractor. This
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reverse signalling was not examined in this paper but may provide an avenue for future
research. Another direction for future research would to examine signals as ex post contract
management mechanisms from the perspective of the psychological contract. While the theory
of the psychological contract more usually discusses the relationship between the employer
and employee, it views signals as spoken and unspoken communications of intentions
influencing behaviours of agents (Rousseau, 1995). Such a perspective may present
opportunities to further explore signal mechanisms in FM services contract management.
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Table 1 Contract management approaches (derived from agency theory)
Agency theory ex
post mechanisms
Incentives

Information systems

Example

Source

Time and materials payments
Fixed price payments

Bajari & Tadelis (2001)
Sappington & Stiglitz (1987)
Eisenhardt (1985)

Monitoring
Reports
Audits

Hansson (2010)
Bajari & Tadelis (2001)
Eisenhardt (1985)

Table 2 Contract management approaches (derived from signals theory)
Signals ex post
mechanisms
Time

Example

Source

Principal expends interpersonal time with the agent
on contract matters

Spence (1973)

Resource

Principal demonstrates control of the necessary
budget, expertise and skills to manage the contract

Lawrence et al (2005)

Position

Principal demonstrates his/her senior organisational
position, or his/her access to senior figures in the
organisation
Agent observes changes from informal verbal to
formal written means of communication by the
principal
Agent observes the principal’s assurances on his/her
ability to perform the contract or the likely benefits
of a good performance
Agent observes that the principal is willing to discuss
contract difficulties

Spence (1973)

Performance

Incentive

Mutual interest
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Nikander & Eloranta (1997)

Bénabou & Tirole (2003)

Spence (1973)

Table 3 Characteristics of the written contracts and their ex post situations
Contract

Description

Principal

Agent

Written
contract
incompleteness

Unforeseen
contract
contingency

Waste removal,
disposal and
management
reports
Provision of
catering in eight
locations

EdCo
Administrator

WasteCo
Manager

EdCo
Administrator

CaterCo
Manager

Cleaning

Routine and
emergency
cleaning

EdCo
Administrator

CleanCo
Manager

Lack of reports;
Delay in roll-out
of recycling
programme
Reports of poor
customer
service;
Decline in
revenue
Threat of
contract
termination

Insurance
Brokerage

Negotiation of
insurance
contracts
Claims
management
Rental of
sizeable
property

EdCo
Administrator

InsureCo
Manager

Written contract
did not specify a
single point of
contact in EdCo
No provision to
remedy poor staff
service to
canteen
customers
No contract
clause to allow
changes to
cleaning hours or
rates
Extent of
technical support
unclear in
contract

EdCo
Administrator

PropCo
Manager

Lack of clarity as
to who is
responsible for
major paintwork

Extensive repainting became
necessary

Waste
Removal

Catering

Property

19

Slow response
to insurance
queries

Table 4 Ex post contract management mechanisms
Contract

Written Contract
Mechanisms - Agency Theory
Incentives

Information
Systems

Unwritten Contract Mechanisms – Signals
Signals sent by principal (P)
Signals observed by agent (A)
Time

Waste
Removal

Prompt payment
of waste charges

Monthly waste
reports and site
meetings

Time spent with
agent discussing
differing
understanding of
the contract
Spends time
writing a report
for the agent.

Catering

Retention of
canteen proceeds

Monthly sales
turnover reports;
Monthly
meetings

Cleaning

Monthly
payments
amounting to €2
million per year

Insurance
Brokerage

Annual fee of
€50,000

Monthly audits
and reports, a
complaints log,
and a monthly
meeting
Monthly
meetings and
written summary
of claims

Willingness to be
personally
available for
informal
discussions
Increased
frequency of
meetings

Property

Annual rent of
€390,000

Quarterly site
meetings; five
yearly review

Increased use of
email and one to
one conversations
with agent

Resource

Position

Performance

Incentive

Mutual
Interest

Agent views
change to formal
written minutes
of meetings

A hears principal
indicate that
changes may
benefit WasteCo
in future tenders
P’s comments to
agent’s senior
management
reinforces agent’s
confidence
Agent sees
benefits to her
prospects by
saving the
contract
Agent suffers a
time penalty in
attending more
frequent meetings

Agent notes
intercession of
senior managers

Agent recognised
imminence of
financial penalty

A observes
principal’s view
of benefits and
shared interest of
EdCo + WasteCo
Agent hears
expression of the
expected mutual
benefits of the
relationship
Agent hears that
both P’s and her
interests served
by continuing the
contract.
Agent hears that
the weekly log
promotes
prospects of both
parties
Agent hears
senior manager
emphasise long
term reputational
interests

Demonstration of
technical
knowledge and
control of budget
Exhibits technical
knowledge in her
study of the
canteen
performance
Display of
confidence in
negotiation skills
within her own
organisation
Introduces the
weekly log as a
management tool

Demonstration of
principal’s access
to senior
management
figures
Indicated that she
had access to
senior decision
makers in EdCo

Indicated intention
of withdrawing
rent; indicated
knowledge of the
law

Calling in senior
manager support
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Agent observes
changes of
communication
from verbal to
written letter

Agent
Response

Agent implements
new waste reports,
and recycling
programme
Agent replaces
unhelpful canteen
manager

Agent re-specifies
tasks to reduce
labour costs and
negotiates
approval
Agent adopts the
weekly log;
Agent improves
response time
Agent agreed to
carry out
structural repairs

Sender

Intentions

Signal

Influence

Figure 1 A simplified model of communication

Performance

Time

Signal

Resource

Incentive

Mutual
interest

Position

Principal

Agent

Figure 2 A model of ex post contract signals
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Receiver

Incentives

Written
Contract

Information
System
Responses

Unwritten
Contract

Signals

Agent

Principal

Figure 3 Conceptual model of ex post contract management
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